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Abstract	
This paper explores the characteristics of repeat victimisation (RV) in relation to fraud and 
computer misuse (F&CM) crimes recorded in Wales, United Kingdom (UK). The wider study 
included mixed-methods analysis of a sample of cases (n = 10,001) reported by individuals in 
Wales, over a period of two years (ending in September 2016). In this paper, key results from 
the quantitative part of this study concerning RV are presented. This paper contributes to an 
empirically grounded understanding RV with respect to F&CM and its insights are of direct 
relevance to theoretical understandings of victimisation and the formulation of interventions 
within the ‘Protect’ strand of policing in the UK. It suggests that older age is associated with 
RV for these crime types, that a repeat report is likely to be of the same general type as the 
crime which preceded it and that interventions to protect individuals from being re-victimised 
are best targeted within two weeks to one month of the first report. The paper also highlights 
the extent to which RV analysis is constrained by the rules which shape crime recording and 
identifies avenues for improvement of data collection and further research. Furthermore, it 
suggests the need to develop a framework of F&CM vulnerability which goes beyond risk of 
re-victimisation and better accounts for and enables a response to victims’ wider support needs. 
Part	I	-	Introduction	
 
The significance of Fraud and Computer Misuse (F&CM) victimisation has been highlighted 
in the UK since 2015 when, for the first time, these crime types were included in the yearly 
crime estimates produced by the Office for National Statistics (ONS), based on the Crime 
Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) [1]. Recent estimates indicate that there were 
approximately 4.6 million incidents of Fraud and 876,000 incidents of Computer Misuse in the 
year ending March 2020, bringing the overall crime estimate from approximately 5.7 to without 
F&CM to 10.2 million estimated crimes [2]. While the same data suggests that only a small 
proportion of these crimes are estimated to be reported to the police (8% of fraud and 2% of 
CM), the total volume of F&CM recorded has increased enormously in the past few years, 
providing a large and rich sample for analysis. Alongside these figures, the UK government 
have committed considerable sums to cyber security - £1.9 billion between 2016 and 2021 [3]. 
As the UK re-considers their cyber-security strategy post-2021, it is timely to consider 
understandings of victimisation in relation to F&CM. 
At the same time, the processes by which victims report F&CM and the ways in which victim 
services are delivered have changed significantly since the UK’s Coalition Government (2010-
2015). Firstly, the reporting of F&CM has improved significantly with the introduction of the 
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National Reporting Centre Action Fraud (AF). Its introduction mirrored equivalent systems in 
the USA and Canada and had been recommended by The Fraud Review, [4] as well as 
academic experts [5, 6]. Following its rollout in 2013, individuals in report F&CM by either 
contacting the AF call centre or using the online reporting tool, resulting in the volume of 
frauds recorded increasing by over 160% between 2011 and 2013 [2]. Secondly, victim support 
services have been decentralised, becoming (or reverting to) local delivery, with the addition 
of competitive bidding for service providers wishing to deliver those services, funded through 
the democratically elected Office of the Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs). [7] 
However, the response received by F&CM victims has come under some scrutiny following 
several AF institutional crisis [8, 9] and it has been noted that there is considerable ‘attrition’ 
within the criminal justice system (CJS) [10]. As such, only a small proportion of calls received 
by AF are labelled crimes (‘crimed’), an even lesser number are reviewed for investigation, of 
which fewer reach the courts. As such, most victims receive no meaningful response from the 
CJS. To a large extent, this is a result of decreasing budgets resulting in other crime types, 
especially violent crimes, being prioritised. However, F&CM has severe impacts on a minority 
of victims [11] and for those victims, a different kind of response is necessary, even if a crime 
investigation is not feasible. Furthermore, the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime [12] calls 
for vulnerable and repeat victims to be identified and offered adequate support. Despite this, 
there is limited research into repeat victims of F&CM [13] and inconsistent definitions of 
vulnerability are used by law enforcement and other agencies [14]. 
As such, the wider study employed a mixed-methods approach to explore F&CM victimisation, 
with a focus on identifying patterns of RV and constructions of vulnerability. It did so through 
the analysis of a two-year sample of crime reports made by individuals in Wales (n = 10,001, 
reference period ending September 2016), linked through a mix of deterministic and 
probabilistic methods to identify reports within that sample which pertained to the same 
individual victim. The study also employed qualitative Thematic Analysis [15] to identify how 
victim vulnerability is constructed within crime reports. In this paper however, the focus is the 
key RV patterns identified through bi-variate quantitative analysis. These patterns provide an 
empirical basis for understanding RV with respect to F&CM and are of direct relevance to the 
formulation of interventions within the ‘Protect’ strand of policing. Unlike the traditional 
‘Pursue’ type activity of investigating crimes to enable prosecutions, ‘Protect’ is focused on 
increasing protection for those who are at risk of (further) victimisation.1 It is argued that 
responding to RV should be prioritised as a broader crime prevention strategy for F&CM, 
especially where there is a focus on meeting the needs of vulnerable victims. 
Part	II	-	Context	
Why	Repeat	Victimisation	Matters	
Early work into RV across all crime types highlighted that as much as 14% of the population 
were repeat victims and that they reported 70.9% of the incidents recorded on the then British 
 
1 F&CM policing strategy in the UK has four strands, following the ‘four Ps’ approach which originated from the 
field of counter-terrorism policing: ‘Pursue’, ‘Prevent’, ’Protect’ and ‘Prepare’. In addition to ‘Pursue’ and 
‘Protect’ already described, ‘Prevent’ is concerned with preventing people from engaging in F&CM and includes 
raising awareness of the consequences of offending and, in the case of CM, initiatives to ensure talented 
individuals are diverted towards legal/ethical ‘hacking’. ‘Prepare’ strand is focused on improving resilience in 
order to reduce the impact of F&CM in the future. 
3 
 
Crime Survey [16]. Furthermore, it has been noted that the average number of crimes 
experienced by the top 10% most victimised households has increased from 57% in 1994 to 
72% in 2012, despite the overall drop since the mid 1990s [17]. RV has since been examined 
across a variety of crime types including racially motivated crime [18], domestic violence [19] 
and domestic burglary [20, 21] but remains under-studied with respect to F&CM [13]. This 
literature shows that patterns of RV reveal important information for the development of crime 
prevention initiatives. This is because being a victim is, “for whatever […] combination of 
reasons, a good predictor of swift future victimisation” [22]. Furthermore, analysis indicates 
that RV does not occur randomly [23-25] and it is associated with specific demographic 
characteristics [17, 26]. As such, in the context of limited resources, crime prevention is well 
targeted at those who have already become victims. 
Despite the scholarship, policy markers’ interest in understanding RV has declined since its 
peak in the 1990s [13]. Furthermore, while the insights from the previously mentioned 
scholarship are extremely useful, crime prevention must be tailored to crime types, victims’ 
circumstances and available local resources. However, little research has been carried out into 
the prevalence and circumstances surrounding repeat victims of F&CM. With some notable 
exceptions [27, 28], it has been noted that the study of cybercrime “through a repeat 
victimisation lens is overdue” [13]. At the same time, recent work has called for the re-
conceptualisation of ‘the victim’ in relation to CM crimes and other crimes with significant 
online/offline dynamics which challenges the idea of a victim as a single agent, victimisation 
as a single event and dichotomies such as online/offline and victim/offender [29]. As such, 
exploring RV will also contribute to these ongoing theoretical debates. 
Defining	and	Measuring	Repeat	Victimisation	
Terms used to refer to the experience of being a crime victim more than once have included 
"revictimisation, multiple victimisation, repeat victimisation, multi-victimisation, repetitive 
victimisation and recidivist victimisation” [22]. The Crime Survey for England and Wales 
(CSEW) defines a repeat victim as someone who was the victim of the same crime type more 
than once (within crime type victim), in the previous 12 months [30]. This is distinguished 
from multiple victimisation which is where a victim experiences more than one crime in the 
previous 12 months, regardless of crime type (across crime type victim). As this paper is limited 
to an analysis of F&CM, the term repeat victim is used to include not only victims who reported 
more than one fraud or more than one computer misuse crime, but also those who reported a 
mix of F&CM within the reference period. 
While there is little research into repeat victims of F&CM, CSEW estimates indicated that 12% 
of Fraud and 11% of CM victims were repeat victims in the year ending March 2020 [31]. The 
extent of RV (within crime type) can also be gauged from the ratio of incidence to prevalence 
rates calculated based on the CSEW. The incidence rate (IR) is the estimated average number 
of incidents per 1000 respondents, while the prevalence rate (PR) counts victims and it is the 
estimated percentage of respondents who were victimised [32]. The measure of crime 
concentration (CC) is the ratio between incidence and prevalence and counts crimes per victim, 
i.e. the average number of victimisations per victim [33]. For most crime types, the effect of 
repeat and multiple victimisation means that incidence will be greater than prevalence and thus 
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concentration will be greater than one.2 IR, PR and CC rates for a number of crime groups 
including F&CM are shown in Table I. 
 
Crime Category IR PR CC 
Theft from the person 0.88 0.84 1.05 
Robbery 0.32 0.30 1.07 
Other theft of personal property 1.44 1.32 1.09 
Fraud 8.08 6.94 1.17 
CM 2.14 1.82 1.18 
Fraud & CM 10.23 8.48 1.21 
Violence 2.74 1.76 1.55 
Table I – Incidence Rates (IR), Prevalence Rates (PR) and Crime Concentration (CC) in year ending September 2019. 
Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW). 
 
As Table I shows, whereas the concentration of F&CM offences is lower than violent crimes, 
it is higher than more comparable offences such as theft from the person and theft of personal 
property. This is indicative of the need to empirically explore RV with respect to F&CM and 
understand how it may impact on understandings of victimisation and crime prevention 
strategies. First however, to generate research questions and hypotheses with respect to F&CM 
repeat victims, known patterns of RV across other crime types were examined. These are 
briefly discussed below. 
 
Patterns	of	Repeat	Victimisation	
As noted above, previous research into RV has established its importance in relation to crime 
prevention. Several key insights are worth noting. Firstly, studies suggest that a large 
proportion of crime was experienced by a small number of repeat victims [16, 34, 35]. This in 
turn suggests that where crime prevention strategies are designed to reduce RV, they will 
“prevent a large proportion of all offences from being committed” [16]. Furthermore, failed 
attempts to fit the distribution of RV to variations of the Poisson model suggest that RV does 
not happen by chance [16, 23, 36, 37] and is associated with specific demographic 
characteristics [17, 26]. Generally, the characteristics that distinguish repeat from one-time 
victims are the same ones that distinguish victims from non-victims. For example, previous 
research has indicated that just as females are significantly more likely to be one-time victims 
of domestic abuse, the same is true of repeat victims [38]. CSEW figures for the year ending 
March 2019 show that the profile of F&CM victims is in some ways similar to other crime 
types (typical victims of CM are young, males), but in others considerably different to that of 
 
2 Prevalence should be greater for crimes with more than one victim. Fraud (particularly online fraud) is often a 
one to many crime. However, due to the way CSEW data is collected based on household and individuals, along 




other crimes (higher socio-economic status and no differences across ethnic backgrounds) [39]. 
Furthermore, a representative study of the UK population indicated that 26% of fraud victims 
became repeatedly victimised in their lifetime [40] and a more recent study of victims and non-
victims found 45% of victims were repeat victims [27]. However, there is little to no research 
examining the profile of one-time vis-à-vis repeat victims of F&CM. 
Furthermore, patterns of RV vary between crime types such that for example, victims of 
domestic abuse are more likely to be re-victimised than victims of other crime types [41]. This 
may be because those individuals were more vulnerable in the first place, or because being a 
victim increased their vulnerability to further victimisation. In other words, RV has been 
conceptualised as both a ‘flag’ for vulnerability or as ‘boosting’ vulnerability to victimisation 
[13, 42]. In RV literature, greater ‘vulnerability’ appears to be conceptualised in narrow sense 
as equivalent to a greater probability of victimisation. However, identifying victims as 
‘vulnerable’ based solely on demographic characteristics can be divisive, says little about how 
RV occurs and would yield too many false positives to be of practical use. In contrast, 
identifying repeat victims is a narrower and more precise way of determining relative 
vulnerability to victimisation, which is the focus of this paper. At the same time, analysing the 
sequence of RV events will illuminate the mechanisms of victimisation itself and is an area for 
further research. 
Another insight from previous research is the association between high rates of RV (‘hot dots’) 
and geographical concentrations of crime (‘hot spots’) [43]. According to this evidence, what 
distinguishes high crime areas is not that more individuals are victims of crime, but that more 
victims of crime are repeatedly victimised. As such, protecting victims from RV will coincide 
with areas where crime is highest and result in crime reduction. This has led to the growth in 
research into ‘near repeats’, predicting where crime will take place next, based on where it has 
previously taken place geographically. However, given the significant online component of 
crimes such as F&CM, this spatial element may be irrelevant. Even if crimes involve both 
online and offline methods (e.g. a victim is cold-called and socially engineered into providing 
information which results in the takeover of their online banking), there are very limited ways 
in which the physical environment determines victim selection – other than, perhaps, having a 
landline phone and/or access to Internet services (services which are, for the most part, 
available throughout England and Wales). As such, RV is likely a more useful metric of crime 
concentration than near-repeats to determine where crime prevention resources should be 
deployed [13]. Finally, RV has been shown to happen relatively soon after the first 
victimisation for repeat crimes of burglary and property crime [44, 45], racial attacks [18] and 
domestic violence [16]. Similar findings also indicate that repeats happen relatively swiftly 
with respect to Computer Misuse offences [46]. This suggests the risk of RV is highest 
immediately after victimisation. 
Part	III	-	Method	
Sample	
The data sampled for quantitative analysis included all crime reports made to AF by victims 
within the four Welsh police forces (Dyfed/Powys, Gwent, North Wales & South Wales), 
between 1st October 2014 and 30th September 2016 (the reference period). Once duplicates 
were removed (n = 147), the sample for analysis became n = 17,049 cases. Of these, n = 11,844 
were identified as pertaining to individual victims (rather than public entitites, businesses or 
other corporate entities). This is equivalent to all reports made within these forces over a period 
6 
 
of two years, which were subsequently divided into eight three-month periods (i.e. four quarters 
per year). The sample start date was determined by what data was available to the Southern 
Wales Regional Organised Crime Unit (SW-ROCU). In addition, SW-ROCU and the author 
expected that by 2014 the quality of the AF data would have stabilised, following the rolling 
out of the service nationally in April 2013. Finally, the researcher requested a two-year sample 
ending in September, as this allowed for a comparison between years and with CSEW estimates 
for the same period. However, due to the availability of personal identifiers required for 
linkage, only individual reports made within three out of the four police forces (Dyfed/Powys, 
Gwent and the South Wales) were used for the RV analysis (n = 10,001). 
 
Collection	Method	
The reported crime dataset was collated by the researcher from the monthly extracts of crimes 
reported to AF, as uploaded by the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) onto the police’s 
NicheRMS system (also monthly) and extracted by SW-ROCU for the purposes of this study.3 
As such, the sampled data provides a snapshot in time, of the new reports at the end of each 
month, made within the reference period. The data was provided to the researcher in four 
separate batches between August 2015 and August 2017. The first batch of data included 
crimes reported by victims in Gwent, Dyfed Powys and South Wales between June 2014 and 
November 2015. The second batch added crimes reported up until February 2016 for the same 
forces. The third batch included data for reports in North Wales for the equivalent period of 
June 2014 to February 2016. Finally, the fourth batch included reports for all four Welsh police 
forces between February and September 2016. 
The research partners sponsored the researcher to obtain the required level of security clearance 
and the data was accessed and processed under strict controls, within secure police premises. 
These unique data-access arrangements allowed for the application of a de-duplication data 
linkage method prior to the anonymisation of the dataset. This de-duplicative linkage was key 
to identifying repeat victims among the reported incidents. Most of the analysis however 
happened after the data had been fully anonymised and securely transported to the University. 
The data collected is thus classed as administrative linked data, i.e. data originally collected by 
AF “expressly for the purpose of conducting administrative tasks and meeting [its] 
administrative responsibilities” [48], which was then further processed by the author to meet 
the needs of the research. The limitations of using this type of administrative data , i.e. police 
reported crime (PRC), in research, have been discussed at length elsewhere and often stem 
from the mis-alignment of the purpose for which the data was originally collected (the 
administration of justice), the collection methods used and the concepts/units measured on one 
hand, and the aims of the research project [5, 49]. By far the greatest limitations of AF data in 
the context of this research relates to the under-reporting of F&CM, the impacts of the Home 
Office Counting Rules (HOCR) on the measurement of RV and the impact of external events 
on the data collection by AF. Each of these will be discussed throughout this paper. In addition, 
there were methodological constrains associated with the linkage method used to identify 
reports by the same individual victim (see below). 
 
3 NicheRMS is an operational platform provided by Niche Technology Incorporated, a private Canadian 
corporation based in Winnipeg, Manitoba. NicheRMS is used by police services in the United States, Canada, the 
United Kingdom, and Australia [47] Niche Techonology. "Who We Serve." https://nicherms.com/who-
we-serve/ (accessed 4 June 2019.. 
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Despite these limitations however, there are considerable benefits in making use of the richness 
of AF data. While under-reported, the volume of crimes which are recorded by AF are 
sufficient for statistical analysis and the insights they provide most relevant where the focus is 
the current CJS response to known victims. Furthermore, as it will be seen below, the linking 
of AF individual records allowed for the observation of RV patterns which cross-sectional 
survey methodologies are ill suited to make visible [50]. Finally, as the discussion in this paper 
highlights, this research aimed in part, to understand the limitations of the data collected by AF 
and make recommendations for improvements which may better enable police forces to meet 
victims’ needs. As such, the limitations of the dataset with respect to identifying RV was a key 
point of interest for investigation. 
 
Data	Analysis	
In this paper, data pertaining to crime reports made within three Welsh police forces (including 
Dyfed/Powys, Gwent and South Wales)4 were linked using a combination of deterministic and 
probabilistic data linkage, using the R package RecordLinkage [51, 52]. This method allowed 
the author to identify reports made by the same victim within the reference period. The quality 
of the linkage was tested using two commonly used linkage quality metrics, precision and recall 
(or sensitivity) [53], based on the clerical review of a sample of 100 pairs of matches. Although 
both precision and recall were estimated at 100%, the linkage method was optimised to 
minimise false-positive matches and thus may have yielded false-negatives (missed matches) 
which were not captured in the reviewed sub-sample. Following the data linkage, bivariate 
statistical analysis was used to explore patterns of RV. Measures of statistical significance and 
effect size are provided throughout. 
Part	IV	-	Results	
Extent	of	Repeat	Victimisation	
Of a total of n = 10,001 incidents reported by individual victims in the three Welsh police 
forces considered for this analysis, a combination of exact and probabilistic linkage techniques 
was used to identify crimes reported by the same individual. This resulted in 350 individual 
repeat victims being identified, who reported 787 crimes between them. This data indicates 
that around 8% of crimes reported by individual victims (and recorded) within the reference 
period were attributable to repeat victims, a somewhat lower figure than expected based on the 
aforementioned CSEW estimates (Figure 1). 
 
 
4 Reports from North Wales were excluded from the repeat victim analysis on the basis that the considerable level 





However, for three main reasons, this is likely an underestimate. Firstly, the limitations of the 
data linkage methodology may have conditioned the number of repeats that could be identified. 
Secondly, because the sample is limited to a two-year period, it is both left and right-censored. 
In other words, both earlier and later reports may be repeats of reports that were out of scope 
and thus not identified as repeats. Finally, the recording of incidents is shaped by the Home 
Office Counting Rules (HOCR) [54]. The application of these rules means that in some cases, 
incidents that happened over several days will be registered as one incident (e.g. an advance 
fee fraud where the victim has sent money to the fraudster several times, over a period of time). 
This is contrasted with crime types such as the hacking of personal accounts, where each 
account hacked will be registered as a separate crime, even if the incidents happened or were 
reported on the same day. 
The impact of the counting rules may therefore also explain the different levels of RV found 
when comparing Fraud to CM. As illustrated in Table II, the extent of RV varied across the 
two crime groups, with a greater proportion of repeat victims among those who reported CM 
crimes. Approximately 3% of fraud victims reported 7% of recorded frauds. For CM, 
approximately 6% of victims reported 15% of crimes. 








1 8527 92.72 96.53 687 85.45 93.99 
2 533 5.8 3.02 59 7.34 4.04 
3 88 0.96 0.33 20 2.49 0.91 
4 23 0.25 0.07 9 1.12 0.31 
5 5 0.05 0.01 20 2.49 0.55 
6 21 0.23 0.04 9 1.12 0.21 
total 
(n>1) 
670 7.29 3.47 117 14.56 6.02 
Table II 
The statistical significance of the difference between the levels of RV reported among CM and 
Fraud victims was significant as confirmed by a Chi-squared test (c2 (1) = 52.86, p < 0.01). In 
addition, the odds ratio was computed indicating that the odds of a victim of CM being a repeat 
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victim are approximately two times higher than those of a Fraud victim (2.17), representing a 
small to medium effect size [55]. This highlights the importance of understanding the data 
collection processes in detail where administrative data is re-purposed for research. While this 
significant suggests a difference between F&CM, it is possible that this is caused by the 
application of HOCR, rather than a higher rate of RV for CM crimes. 
Alongside the above, this data indicates that there is a significant difference between the 
number of repeat versus one-time crime reports across the three Welsh forces considered (c2 
(2) = 16.26, p < 0.01). The standardised residuals indicate that this difference is driven by 
reports in Dyfed/Powys being significantly more likely to be made by repeat than one-time 
victims and conversely, those reported in South Wales being significantly more likely to be 
made by one-time than repeat victims (p < 0.01) (Table III). However, the effect size based on 
Cramér's V (0.04) is negligible [56]. As such, further research is needed to fully understand 
differences in RV across these Welsh forces. Nonetheless, it is clear that measuring RV can 
identify areas where interventions to reduced RV are most needed, were this analysis to be 
extended to all police forces in England and Wales. 
 
Force Victim Type N St. Residuals 
Dyfed/Powys Once 2210 -3.60** 
 Repeat 234 3.60** 
Gwent Once 2200 -0.57 
 Repeat 195 0.57 
South Wales Once 4804 3.58** 
 Repeat 358 -3.58** 
Table III – Number of Repeat and One-Time Reports by Force along with Chi-squared standardised residuals. ** 
indicates statistical significance at p < 0.01. 
Repeat	Victims	Characteristics	
Demographic	Characteristics	
The data were analysed to establish whether repeat victims’ characteristics differed 
significantly from one-time victims with respect to variables of criminological interest 
including gender, ethnicity and age. This analysis revealed that more incidents were reported 
by male victims were repeats when compared to incidents reported by female victims (Figure 
2). A chi-squared test (c2(1) = 14.05 p < 0.01, ) and Cramér's V (0.03) suggest a statistically 
significant difference, but a negligible effect size. This negligible effect is further illustrated by 
the odds ratio as the odds of an incident being reported by male repeat victim are only 1.33 
times higher than those of an incident reported by a female victim. Furthermore, no significant 
difference was found between one-time and repeat victims in terms of ethnicity (c2(1)= 0.067, 
p > 0.5). However, this result may be skewed by the overwhelming number of missing values 
for the ethnicity variable (34% missing). In addition, due to the small number of cases in most 
categories (apart from ‘White’) a binary White or Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) had to be 






The largest effect with respect to victim characteristics found was victims’ age, with the typical 
repeat victim being older than one-time victims. This is visible on the age histograms of repeat 
and non-repeat victims, with fewer reports from the younger victims in the repeat victim group 
(Figure 3). In addition, both the mean and the median age at the time of reporting are higher 
for repeat (median age 57, mean age 53.6) than one-time victims (median age 50, mean age 
49.93). The significance of the difference between the mean age between these groups was 
confirmed with a significant Wilcoxon rank-sum (W = 3197004, p < 0.001). 
 
Figure 3 
It is possible that the linkage methodology introduced a bias towards linking for older victims, 
thus over-representing older repeat victims. However, date of birth (DOB) was a key 
component of the linkage method and there were instances of proxy reports on behalf of older 
victims (by family and friends). If anything, this should have led to increased inaccuracy and 
missing values for the DOB provided for older victims. As such, these findings are indicative 
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of overlap between RV and older age, i.e. a greater risk of or vulnerability to (re-)victimisation 
for older victims. However, qualitative analysis is required in order to better understand how 
and why older victims may be more vulnerable to RV. Furthermore, the negative impacts of 
F&CM victimisation, particularly on older victims, are varied and may affect the victim’s 
wellbeing, family relationships and cause indirect financial losses [11, 57]. Such impacts may 
also be associated with factors beyond the crime itself, such as social isolation or economic 
disadvantage. Conceptualising vulnerability to extend beyond the direct harms of crime and 
the increased likelihood of (repeat) victimisation will be necessary to the provision of adequate 
victim support for some victims. 
Finally, it had been hypothesized that cases flagged as having been reported by a “proxy” on 
behalf of the victim may be associated with RV and therefore greater vulnerability to 
victimisation. This hypothesis was formulated based on anecdotal evidence from practitioners 
that often friends and family reported on behalf of especially vulnerable individuals. These in 
turn, were expected to be significantly more likely to be repeatedly victimised. Within the 
overall sample, 10% of incidents were reported by proxy (n = 1,024). However, the data shows 
the opposite to the expected effect – a greater proportion of one-time victims (11%) were 
flagged for a proxy report than repeat victims (6%). This was a statistically significant 
difference, but the effect size negligible (c2(1) = 13.58, p < 0.01, Cramér's V = 0.04). This 
raises the possibility that practitioners’ experience is indicative of proxy reports being 
associated with wider vulnerability factors, which are not captured by RV measures alone. 
Further research is required on this point. 
Time-Course	of	Repeat	Victimisation	
Previous literature has highlighted the importance of the time-course of RV and its implications 
for crime prevention activities. As such, the time-course of RV was investigated with respect 
to this sample. As the sample spanned two years, a small number of cases linked across a period 
longer than one year would have skewed the analysis towards longer periods between events, 
particularly towards the end of the reference period. As such, the time-course analysis provided 
below is limited to consecutive reports within 12 months (n = 406), excluding that small 
minority of cases where the time difference was greater than 366 days (n = 31).5 
Inter-report	Time	
The first aspect investigated with respect to time-course was the distribution of the inter-report 
time – i.e. the distribution of the time elapsed between consecutive incidents. As shown in 
Figure 4, the distribution is concentrated at the lower end of the scale and the graph gives the 
appearance of an exponential decrease in the number of incidents as the time difference 
between them increases. 
 
5 The year was assumed to have a maximum of 366 days given that 2016 was a leap year. In addition, the time 
course analysis only counts the time difference between reports made by the same individual. As such, the first 






This is in line with previous research into repeat network attacks [46] although no equivalent 
research is available with respect to fraud. In addition, 15.5% of all linked (repeat) incidents 
were reported on the same day (n = 122). How multiples instances reported on the same day 
are recorded however, depends on the Home Office Counting Rules for each specific category 
of F&CM. In some cases, multiple same-day reports are recorded separately e.g. where 
multiple online accounts are hacked, one report per account is made. In others, arguably 
separate instances of victimisation are recorded as one crime e.g. multiple payments requested 
by the same fraudster over time. As shown in research into repeat victim referrals [58], this 
analysis highlights how crime recording practices have an impact on the identification and 
measurement of RV also for F&CM crimes. 
The exponential distribution of time differences (made starker by the number of same day 
reports) means that the median is a better representation of a typical time difference between 
reports than the mean. The overall mean difference between reports is 83 days and the median 
12 days (excluding same day reports, the mean is 115 days and the median 40 days). In addition, 
the mean difference between the first and last report by individual repeat victims is 137 days 
and the median 49 days (excluding same day reports). As such, this data suggests that 
interventions aimed to protect victims from being re-victimised should ideally take place within 
two weeks to one month of the first report. Furthermore, on the one hand there is some 
indication that this tendency for a higher concentration of consecutive reports within the lower 
range of time differences seems to hold over time, when examined across each of the quarters 
of the two-year period under study. On the other hand, the data becomes considerably more 
dispersed in year two. This increased dispersion is observable in the mean and median time 
differences over time (Table IV). 
year quarter n mean(diff) median(diff) max(diff) 
2014-2015 Q1 43 4.02 0 45 
 
Q2 73 12.16 2 136 
 
Q3 85 34.48 7 208 
 
Q4 46 43.43 5 306 
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2015-2016 Q1 23 134.22 122 338 
 
Q2 45 142.71 97 363 
 
Q3 36 81.61 25.5 357 
 
Q4 55 67.33 30 338 
Table IV – Frequency, mean, median and maximum values for the time difference between consecutive reports, per 
quarter. 
This effect is most likely caused by the left-censoring of the data – for the earlier periods, there 
is a shorter period available within which the previous event could have occurred. As such, 
there will be more first events in a series within the first quarter of the first year. In addition, a 
crises at AF between the last quarter of the first year and the first quarter of the second, had a 
considerable impact on the number of reports recorded.6 At the same time, right-censoring of 
the data might also contribute to the median peaks in the middle of the two-year sample period. 
As such, while this data is indicative of an exponential distribution of the time differences 
between reports, further (longitudinal) research is required to fully substantiate this claim. 
Number	of	Repeats	
There is mixed evidence with respect to the relationship between the number of RV reports and 
the time difference between reports. Table V gives the appearance of a general decrease in the 
mean time-difference between reports, particularly the number of reports is greater than five. 
In fact, a Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test confirmed that there was a statistically significant 
difference between the mean time difference grouped by number of reports made (c2(5) = 
1369.8 p < 0.01). However, using the R function pairwise.wilcox.test to calculate pairwise 
comparisons between group levels with corrections for multiple testing, it was concluded that 
only where nreports = 5, is the mean time diff significantly different from the nreports groups 
2 to 4 (p < 0.05). Furthermore, the previously noted dispersal of the data suggests that 
differences in means between these groups may be of little practical consequence, as they do 
not capture the most typical values in the data. As such, while more evidence is needed, this 
analysis suggests that the number of repeat reports has little impact on the time-course of RV. 





2 93 days 35 days 296 
3 77 days 45 days 72 
4 79 days 83 days 24 
5 17 days 28 days 20 
 
6 In July 2015, the company who ran the AF call centre, Broadcasting Support Services (BSS), went into 
administration upon losing the tender contract for the continued provision of this service to IBM [59] A. 
Rucki, "Broadcasting Support Services call centre goes into administration risking more than 100 jobs," 
Manchester Evening News, 24 July 2018. [Online]. Available: 
https://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester-news/broadcasting-support-services-call-
centre-9718206, [60] Unknown, "Victims of Fraud Suffer Hotline Blow," in Mail on Sunday, ed. London, 
2015. This left AF operating with a skeleton staff and had a direct impact on victims’ ability to report crime within 
the four police forces sampled for this study. As a result, there was a sharp decrease in the volume of recorded 
crimes between quarter 4 of 2014-2015 and quarter 1 of 2015-2016 in this sample. 
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6 39 days 28 days 25 
Table V – Summary table of time difference between consecutive reports in days, grouped by number of reports made 
(nreports). 
Crime	Categories	
In addition to the previously noted difference between the Fraud and CM crime groups, 
differences in the extent of RV across crime categories were also found to be statistically 
significant (c2 (1) = 52.86, p < 0.01, Cramér's V = 0.11). While the Cramér's V is indicative of 
a small effect size, the standardised residuals in Table VI suggest that the difference is driven 
by the fact that reports of Advance-fee fraud and Hacking were more likely to be from repeat 
victims, while reports of Consumer and Other Fraud were more likely to be from one-time 
victims (p < 0.01). 
Crime Category Victim 
Type 
N Prop St. 
Residuals 




Repeat 198 0.25 2.95** 
Card and Banking 
fraud 
Once 445 0.05 2.43 
 
Repeat 23 0.03 -2.43 




Repeat 324 0.41 -2.85** 
Hacking Once 439 0.05 -9.76** 
 
Repeat 102 0.13 9.76** 
Investment fraud Once 174 0.02 -1.76 
 
Repeat 22 0.03 1.76 
Malware, virus & 
(D)DOS 
Once 248 0.03 1.32 
 
Repeat 15 0.02 -1.32 




Repeat 82 0.1 -4.19** 
Services fraud Once 242 0.03 -0.07 
 
Repeat 21 0.03 0.07 
Table VI - – Number of repeat and one-time reports by crime category, proportion of total reports, along with Chi-
squared standardised residuals. ** indicates statistical significance at p < 0.01. 
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The next aspect to be analysed concerned the sequence of crimes experienced by repeat victims. 
Table VII provides a matrix for the observed sequences, including the count for each 
combination of consecutive crimes reported by individual victims, along with row percentages 
and standardised residuals. Given the small numbers in some of the combinations, a number of 
categories were combined: the category of Malware, Virus & (D)DOS was combined with the 
category Hacking; Other and Services fraud were combined into Computer Misuse (CM); and, 
finally, the categories of Card and Banking and Investment Fraud were also combined. 
Looking across the highlighted diagonal in Table VII, it becomes apparent that in the great 
majority of cases, the repeat crime is of the same type as the crime that preceded it. The 
significant difference between the possible combinations of crime categories for consecutive 
reports was confirmed with a Chi-squared test (c2 (16) = 511.20, p < 0.01, Cramér's V = 0.54). 
Furthermore, the standardised residuals in Table VII confirm that this difference is driven by 
the repeat victimisation being significantly more likely to be of the same type as the crime 







Investment   
Consumer Hacking   Other 
Advance-fee 66 7 23 3 13 
 
58.93% 6.25% 20.54% 2.68% 11.61% 
 




8 9 2 1 4 
33.33% 37.50% 8.33% 4.17% 16.67% 
0.93 6.34** -2.32 -1.59 0.23 
Consumer 21 6 125 15 12 
 
11.73% 3.35% 69.83% 8.38% 6.70% 
 
-3.36** -1.42 7.13** -3 -2.83** 
CM 3 1 6 57 2 
 
4.35% 1.45% 8.70% 82.61% 2.90% 
 
-3.33** -1.53 -3.89** 12.73** -2.58 
Other 7 3 7 2 34 
 
13.21% 5.66% 13.21% 3.77% 64.15% 
 
-1.61 -0.09 -2.87** -2.43 9.3** 
Table VII – Change matrix of consecutive reports, including, for each combination of consecutive categories the count, 
row percentage and standardised residuals. **residual significant at the p < 0.01 level. 
Part	V	-	Discussion	of	Results	and	Implications	for	Crime	Prevention	
This analysis revealed that a significant proportion of victims who report F&CM are repeat 
victims, with 4% of victims reporting 8% of crimes. In addition, if the crime groups are 
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considered separately, approximately 3% of fraud victims reported 7% of recorded frauds, 
while approximately 6% of CM victims reported 15% of CM crimes. However, this difference 
is likely the result of the application of HOCR. In addition, categories including Advance-fee 
Fraud and Hacking were associated with a higher likelihood of repeat victimisation. This is 
especially striking for Advance-fee Fraud as, unlike Hacking, the HOCR will favour the 
recording of one crime where the same individual is victimised multiple times by the same 
offender. For example, if a victim acquiesces to multiple requests for money by the same 
offender and these are reported at the same time, only one crime will be recorded. In contrast, 
one crime is recorded for each account/device hacked. Moreover, where victims are victimised 
repeatedly, this tends to be within the same general crime category. Nonetheless, it is important 
that individuals understand that certain crime types (e.g. Advance-fee and Investment Fraud) 
have in themselves varied modus operandi. Neglecting this may hinder the effectiveness of 
prevention advice/messaging. In addition, a statistically significant difference, albeit with a 
negligible effect size, was found between the proportion of RV found across the three forces, 
driven by a greater proportion of repeat victims in Dyfed/Powys. Given the association found 
between RV and older age, this likely results from the older profile of victims from 
Dyfed/Powys (on average 55, median 57, when the average and median for Gwent and South 
Wales were both 50 and 48 respectively). Nonetheless, this analysis highlights the potential of 
measuring RV across all forces may help identify where greater victim support resources are 
needed. 
The overall extent of RV may be under-estimated due to the F&CM under-reporting and the 
fact that arguably distinct incidents are sometimes registered as one crime. Nonetheless, these 
results lend strength to the argument that overall crime volumes could be reduced by targeting 
prevention at those likely to become repeat victims and making all victims aware of the 
potential for RV. While the extent of RV observed in this dataset is not of the same order of 
magnitudes found within other types of crime (violent crime and domestic violence in 
particular), identifying and targeting prevention measures at repeat victims would still help 
reduce the volume of F&CM crimes. It may also help provide a meaningful and victim-centred 
law enforcement response, in a context where the great majority of F&CM crimes reported to 
the police are not ‘actioned’ in any way. By ‘actioned’ it is meant that the report is reviewed 
by the NFIB and, where applicable, referred to a police force and/or partner agency for a 
response including, among others, investigation or victim support. Within this sample, only 
15% of all recorded crimes were actioned in some way [61]. In this context, the need to focus 
on prevention and protecting victims from being re-victimised is possibly the most effective 
crime reduction strategy. As such, the identification and response to repeat victims of F&CM, 
as suggested by others in relation to other crimes [62], may provide a clear and meaningful 
measure of law enforcement response and performance. 
This analysis suggests that male and older victims are at higher risk of becoming repeat victims, 
while ethnicity and proxy reports made on behalf of the victim had no effect. While this is 
considerably different to the typical repeat victim profile for other crime types (e.g. violent 
crime and domestic violence), it is in line with the profile of F&CM victims. As such, this 
analysis suggests that, similarly to other crime types [17, 26], the characteristics that distinguish 
repeat from one-time victims, are similar to those that distinguish victims from non-victims. 
Furthermore, in line with previous research [e.g. 46, 63] the analysis of the time-course of 
F&CM RV suggests that crime prevention activities will be most effective within two weeks 
to a month of first victimisation. However, the scope for intervention is reduced when 
considering the time-course of repeats as 16% of these were recorded on the same day.  
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At the same time however, this paper illustrates throughout how recording practices impact the 
ability to identify repeat victims. Reflecting the HMIC’s [38] findings and as corroborated by 
Shorrock and colleagues [58] in the context of domestic violence and repeat safeguarding 
referrals respectively, recording practices may lead to the over-estimation of RV in the case of 
CM and its under-estimation in the case of fraud. With respect to fraud, the Modus Operandi 
of the crime often involves building trust with the victim over a period of time and often an 
escalation of intimacy and/or requests for money until the point where that trust is ultimately 
broken [e.g. 64, 65]. In such situations, it is likely that each incident would be recorded on the 
same day, but it may be questioned whether the victim experiences one instance of 
victimisation (over a period of time) or several. Nonetheless, even when victims report multiple 
crimes on the same day, there is an opportunity to establish whether they are in fact a repeat 
victim and therefore make appropriate support should be made available to avoid further re-
victimisation. Adding to previous research [61], it is thus suggested that while police records 
collected by AF provide a rich source of data, improving data collection so that repeat victims 
and patterns of RV are more easily identified would both enabled further research and aid local 
forces in the delivery (or facilitation) of a more victim-focused response. 
Finally, identifying the factors which are associated with RV is essential to enable forces to 
seek to reduce RV and, as directed by the Victims’ Code, provide support to repeat victims. 
However, if interventions are to successfully meet victims’ needs, vulnerability may need to 
be conceptualised in broader terms, beyond individual characteristics which may or not predict 
likelihood of re-victimisation. In itself, being or not re-victimised says little about individuals’ 
support needs or their ability to recover from the impact of being victimised. As such, a 
framework of F&CM vulnerability is needed which goes beyond risk of re-victimisation and 
better accounts for and responds to victims’ wider needs. However, as others have noted, 
current understandings of vulnerability are inconsistently deployed across police forces [14] 
and work is needed to identify how best ‘the vulnerable’ may be identified. 
Part	VI	-	Conclusion	
Repeat victimisation (RV) is a ‘complex phenomenon’ [66] which can result from a plethora 
of factors. Furthermore, victimisation to F&CM is known to be largely under-recorded and 
this, along with the rules that govern the recording of crime, affects the measurement of RV. 
Nonetheless, even after considering the limitations associated with police recorded crime and 
those imposed by the linkage methodology, this analysis demonstrates that identifying and 
analysing patterns of RV within reported crime will produce insights of theoretical interest and 
of value to the planning and targeting of crime prevention activities. 
Identifying RV could help target limited resources towards areas where demand for crime 
prevention and victim-support is greater. If there are differences in levels of repeat 
victimisation across England and Wales, identifying these victims would enable a better 
allocation of crime prevention resources. Furthermore, it could enable strategic resource 
allocation within each force, towards crime types where re-victimisation is more common and 
individuals who are most vulnerable to further victimisation. Here, repeat victims’ 
characteristics along with the typical patterns of RV should inform prevention advice and 
awareness raising campaigns within communities. 
At the same time, this paper has also highlighted the limitations of the RV lens. The 
measurement of RV is inevitably shaped by how it is defined and, in the case of this study, by 
recording practices. Furthermore, while useful as a crime-reduction strategy, RV should be 
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understood as a much narrower concept than ‘vulnerability’, particularly where assessments of 
vulnerability are used to determine what support is made available to victims of F&CM. 
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